In this paper examines the roles and influence of China in the world and, mainly, in European Union. For a decade, Chinese investors have been looking for opportunities to buy european assets. Especially since the beginning of the 2008 crisis we observed an increase of investment activities of Chinese companies. During the crisis, cash troubled european companies due to loss of liquidity were forced to sell their shares at significant discount. Over time, with stabilizing the economic situation in Europe, European companies asset prices seemingly ceased to be cheap, nevertheless a volume of Chinese FDI to Europe continued to grow. Our goal will be detailed insight into these investments and try to identify the benefits and risks of these investments. Moreover, this paper not only provide insight into economic development of Chinese FDI but also take into account political issues and background of these investment. As far as a methodology is concerned, the basis of our work will be comparing an impact of Chinese investments in European countries and their impact on economic development in selected countries. In particular, we are interested in the behavior of Chinese investors and their motivation to buy in Europe. At the same time it will also be interested in the motives of European companies that have decided to sell shares to new owners. Finally, we will also examine ways in which Chinese investors proceed with acquisitions in the EU. Data comes from Eurostat, the national statistical offices and stock market prices. We will also be examining the political influence on these countries individually and globally, therefore as part of the EU. Based on the gained information we will try to assess the current situation of China's influence in the euro area and at the same time try to estimate its future impact. Finally, based on the detected information to analyze the results of our research.
Introduction
We are entering a new era of Chinese capital. China's policy is loosening and the process of adapting of its growth model to new trends will transform the country to a driving force in global cross-border investment in the coming decade. We are witnessing China plans to triple its global assets from the current 6.4 trillion to 20 trillion up to 2020. This will have a significant impact on the host countries. Noticeable increase of Chinese investment on a global scale will require political leaders, in invested countries, impose extensive adjustments to economic policies so that they can get the most benefit from Chinese investment and also to minimize new potentecial risks (Hanemann and Huotari, 2015) .
The influence of China on the European Union has grown rapidly since the beginning of crisis in 2008. With the deepening crisis combined with weak euro and low asset prices create opportunities for Chinese investors to buy European companies and other European assets and government bonds at very favourable prices.
On the one hand, the supply of liquidity to the cash-troubled European companies in many cases is a positive contribution especially in terms of maintaining jobs and social securities. At the same time, the provision of funds to government budget of southern European countries in particular, helping them to avert the possibility of state bankruptcy.
On the other hand, the size and development of the Chinese economy and its links with the global economy can pose a risk for the euro area. For example, China is one of the largest consumers of energy, particularly oil, where the drop in consumption is immediately reflected in global oil prices. Furthermore, it is necessary to think about the economic and political intentions of China. Nevertheless, Chinese money does not come for free and some return of favour is expected.
Chinese investments in Europe
As we can see in the In 2011, Chinese investments have increased more than threefold over $ 10 billion. In 2014, Chinese FDI into the EU reached a new record of $ 18 billion. While in the early stages of the recession in Europe, Chinese direct investment were fueled by low prices of assets in the cash-trapped companies. However, even at a later stage, Chinese appetite for investment in Europe is not decreasing even when prices of assets is no longer as atrractive as they were during the worst period of the crisis. On the contrary, Chinese FDI is growing, the vast proportion of the investment goes to the mergers and acquisitions of existing companies (Figure 2 ) (Baker & Mackenzie, Feb 2015) . Thus we can see that the demand of Chinese companies to invest in the EU is not just a temporary phenomenon associated with favorable asset prices. In other words, we are witnessing a new trend of Chinese investment. 
Source

Distribution of Chinese investment
In case of Chinese FDI in the EU, Europe's largest economy were also the largest recipients of Chinese investment. More than 50% of cumulative investments since 2000 to 2014 came mainly in the group Big 3 (Britain, Germany and France). A notable change came in investment in PIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain). Total investment in these countries before 2011 amounted to less than 10%, whereas in the years 2012 to 2014 had risen to more than 30% when the Chinese corporation took the opportunity to buy companies at once state-controlled sectors, including transportation (Hanemann and Huotari, 2015) . Chinese buying spree in Europe also continued in 2015. In England, Chinese investments dominated in the energy sector, specifically in the construction of the planned C block nuclear reactor at Hinkley Point. The transaction will reach up to 8 billion pounds for the 33.5 percent stake. In addition to investments in the energy sector, large acquisitions also took place in other sectors, mainly real estate such as an acquisition of the second largest European hotel empire Louvre Hotel Group, the deal valued at $ 1.43 billion agreed with state-owned companies Shanghai Jin Jiang International Hotels (Chiu, Jan 2015) . Furthermore, acquisitions also occurred in the technology sector, for example the Dutch semiconductor company NXP, which sold its RF division specialised in manufacturing radio communication for $ 1.8 billion. The buyer is a state-owned company Jianguang Asset Management Co (Higginbotham, May 2015) .
A dominant investor in this shopping spree is a Chinese state-owned company -Chinachem -so far the most famous deal was a purchase of Italian industrial icons -Pirelli. 143 year old italian giant, the fifth largest tire manufacturer in the world was sold for 7.7 billion US dollars (Michelson, Mar 2015) . After buying Pirelli, ChemChina's taste for even more investments. In January 2016 has announced acquisition of KraussMaffei, a German manufacturer of plastics, rubber, tracked vehicles for $ 1 billion (BBC, Jan. 2016). However the shopping spree does not end here. The fact that the ChemChina still has sufficient money and taste for even more magnificient investments is demonstrated by an acquisition of Syngenta, the Swiss producer of plant protection products, for 44 billion USD. In fact, if the deal is successful, it will be China's largest overseas acquisition so far (Browning, Jan 2016) .
Motivation behind the shopping spree
Although the decisive reason for exponentially growing Chinese FDI are loosening rules of capital controls in the Chinese economy as well as moderate supervision of the Chinese currency, it is necessary to examine reasons and intentions of Chinese investors more in detail.
At first glance it might seems that the majority of Chinese companies investing in Europe are stateowned enterprises (Figure 4 ) investing in assets whose prices were substantially reduced during the crisis. However, a closer look at closed deals will reveal a big picture. First, China no longer wants to be presented as a copycat nation (Thompson, May 2016) . In recent years, with declining exports, China is trying to refocus on the domestic market. It is investing in technology while trying to acquire technology from abroad. Therefore, we can see that the bulk of Chinese investment in Europe is heading into technology companies.
Second, another factor in the increased interest of Chinese investors to invest in Europe can be caused by direct problems in the Chinese economy. China has for a long time struggling with declining productivity and turbulences in equity markets. Chinese economy has beed declining gradually from 9.7% in 2011 to 7.3% in 2014 ( Figure 5 ), and in 2015 Chinese GDP is expected to grow as low as 6.9% (Allen, Jan 2016) . Given the current trends in the national economy of China and pressures to diversify the economy slowing and increasing appetite of Chinese investors to expand abroad while increasing their willingness to take higher risks. First, private companies are beginning to exploit newly gained freedom to invest abroad, which is the main motivation for direct investment in Europe and elsewhere in thrw world. On the other side, Chinese institutional investors, including sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies, private funds and financial conglomerates are also very active in foreign investment searching for opportunities to diversify the huge finances they are managing and which the vast majority of inverstments are currently in the form of domestic assets (Hanemann and Huotari, 2015) . In addition, European stable business environment and its obligation to respect the right to property is also a good incentive for Chinese FDI. Thirdly, China has has introduced a mega project so called "one route, one belt" which aims to reestablish and restore the Silk Road connecting China with Europe. The plan is not just a connection by land but also by sea (Map 1), which includes recently privatised Greek port -Piraeus (Costas, Dec 2015) . The USD 1.5 billions deal backed by state owned company Cosco, will be a maritime gateway to Europe (Hope, Jan 2016) . Besides investments in seaports, China is trying to invest in countries along the Silk Road through Asian infrastructure investment bank project.
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Map 1: One route, one pelt Fourth, China is the most populous nation in the world. With almost 1.4 billion people and the exponential population growth. Even faster growth is expected in following years after abandonment of one-child policy, therefore China is aware of the need assure supply and safety of food for population in the country. Hence to achieve this aim China has adjusted its strategy of abroad investments. A relevant example is the purchase of three million hectares of arable land in Ukraine, which represents for 5% of Ukraine (Jourdan, Sep 2013) . Syngenta acquisition is therefore a logical step towards ensuring China's food supply and safety. By aquiring Syngenta, China as one of the largest consumers of fertilizer will gain technologies that significantly strengthens its agricultural production. The company is technologically advanced in seeds research and development of biotechnology. Now we know why China wants to invest in the EU, but on the other hand, we should also explain why European states are willing to sell their assets. We must take into account that the inflow of Chinese capital in many cases means the supply of liquidity to the cash-troubled economies and therefore should not surprise us the willingness of some countries to sell their national treasures. Morever companies themselve benefit from Chinese FDI generally associated with keeping jobs and provide fund for research and development. China is so unique and important because it is already a major global investor and it has the potential to become the single most important driver of global FDI growth over the next decade. Therefore, what should be put on notice is the simplicity and effectiveness of the strategies that Chinese investors apply in a process of acquisition of European companies.
Hunt for European businesses
Even though the price of the assets of European companies are no longer as attractive as it was during the financial crisis, the trend of Chinese investment suggests expansion of new investments.
With generous subsidies provided by state-owned banks, SOEs investing in Europe has an access to plenty of credit for acquisitions. Therefore, they can afford very simple but yet very effective strategy. If a target european company is not for sale at market prices, Chinese investors will increase their bid until the offer is too atractive to be rejected. Very good evidence can be seen at the acquisition of Swiss Syngenta.
As far as Syngenta is concerned (Figure 6 ), the company market capitalization before an acquisition announcement in October was as high as 30 billion USD. However Chinachem has offered 44 billion. USD, representing 147% of the market value of the company. This investment is also China's biggest overseas takeover in history so far (Donnan, Feb 2016) . 
Risks of Chinese investment
In times of financial downturn and stagnation, cash injections from China may seem like free money falling from sky. Nevertheless, these investments might represent a significant risk for Europe. Chinese enterprises investing in Europe are mostly state-owned or have very strong ties to the state. First, the purchase of government bonds, mainly from southern European countries, will directly affect debt policies in these countries (Wagner, Dec 2010) . With increasing investments also increases the impact of Chinese companies on employment and social security in a host country.
In some cases, favoring Chinese economic injection of money over the political sobriety can lead to an indirect restriction of democratic principles and values recognized by the country. For instance, the Prime Minister of United Kingdom David Cameron refused to meet with the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama. The last meeting between the leaders in 2013 sparked an angry response from the Chinese government. China's foreign ministry said the meeting "seriously interfered with China's internal affairs" and "hurt" Chinese feelings. After a warning that Cameron's inappropriate actions may hurt China-UK economic relations, The British premier has not meet Dalai Lama officially ever since (Mctague, Sep 2015) .
Chinese companies predominantly invest in mergers and acquisitions and only minimum of investments are involved in greenfield projects (Figure 2) . Critics point out that in the short and medium term such investment will not create any new jobs. While the studies suggest positive impact of Chinese greenfield investment in a process of creating new jobs, in the case of mergers and acquisitions the impact on the economy is less clear. Nevertheless, merger and acquisition may be only way to save the company from bankruptcy and, therefore, saving jobs. On the other hand, if the post-acquisition stresses is misunderstood and poorly absorbed, it can lead to layoffs or even extracting valuable assets of newly acquired companies (Hanneman, Sep 2012).
The other risk includes inequal opportunities for investment. While Chinese investors have considerably more opportunities for investments in the European market due to more liberal rules, European investors on contrarey have very limited opportunities for investment in China. Especially, in sectors where direct investment is prohibited by Chinese government, such as the energy sector. It is also necessary to take into account industries, where foreign investors is required to create strategic partnership with their Chinese counterparts in order to enter the market (MOFCOM, 2012).
Finally, Chinese diplomats increasingly use the promise of investment and other financial flows as a diplomatic instrument to seek politically favourable outcomes in negotiations with the EU and its member states. The promise of investment is used the leverage on political decisions not only in a EU but also can influence decision making process in the euro area on critical issues. For example, the decision of the International Monetary Fund to include yuan, the Chinese currency, to its reserve the currency basket in November 2015, despite of arguments that the yuan has not yet fully meet the criteria (IMF, 2015) . Recently, competition between European countries on Chinese investment creates room for further deepening of relations with China and, hence, exposure to a greater Chinese influence. This raises a dilemma how much should host economies be succumbing to China's influence and its interests. Since each country in the EU is aware of a fact that if they refuse the money, the other EU countries are happy to accept Chinese investments. This race for Chinese investment is also contributing to a division between European economies over important economic policy decisions. As a consequence, opinions among EU countries on important economic issues are fragmented wheter or not to grant China market economy status.
Czechia case
Very distintive case of the contrast between economic interests and democratic principles was a twoday of state visit of Chinese President in the Czech Republic on 29.03.2016. Due to the sensitive issue of China and human rights, the visit by President Xi Jinping have drawn protests from the Czech opposition. On the one hand, czech police weas under strong criticism on the practices during a crackdown on human rights activists. Numerous clashes occured between human right activists with tibetan flags and pro-China supporters. According to the media, police intervened against activists more than the Chinese. One noticable evidence of violation of the freedom of expression was the case of Tibetan flag placed on the Prague Film Academy (FAME) building by students with a dean's permission. University personnel were questioned by policemen. Czech police later admited the error and apologized (Polak, Apr 2016) . On the other hand, there is no doubt about the economic benefit that Zeman was able to attract. More than 30 deals were closed during the visit. Over 5 years period more than 232 billion czech crowns will be invested in Czechia (Štůsek, Apr 2016).
Conclusion
To summarize, we can see that the influence of China in the Eurozone and European Union significant. In one aspect it means a positive influence. First of all, we emphasize the rescue of heavily indebted eurozone countries by providing much needed liquidity into economy. Second, to save and preserve jobs in companies in the form of mergers and acquisitions. Thirdly, to promote growth of the Eurozone economy through various projects such as the new Silk Road project with the support of the newly formed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
From a negative point of view, given the size and interconnectedness of the Chinese economy with the global economy and thus growth of the most populous country, the downturn, the losses are immediately reflected in the performance of the world economy. In addition, the decline in growth of the Chinese economy also leads to changes accompanying effects such as lower fuel consumption, which sharply depresses oil prices and this has an impact on the economies of which are oil producers. Considerable may also be an influence of the Chinese government through the state-owned companies investment in Europe. Furthermore, we see the potential negative impact on political decisions or indirect suppression of Western moral principles in exchange for economic cooperation and Chinese investment.
It will also be important to examine how European leaders adapt political priorities in anticipation of a massive influx of cheap Chinese money. Whether Europe keeps open policy towards Chinese investment because their advantage in terms of potential opportunities to increase productivity and employment or the EU will try to take measures against the Chinese expansion, thus limiting its possible negative impact on EU decision-making at the political level.
Taking into account our findings, we are assume that inflow of Chinese investment will continue to increase. With the inflow of financial aids, China's influence EU countries will also increase. Obviously the Eurozone crisis is not yet over and with deepening migration crisis , EU countries will need even more liquidity in their economies, while China still has sufficient free capital.
